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INTERAGENCY CONFLICT: A MODEL FOR
ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Growth in the size and scope of our government has been a con-
stant feature of life in twentieth century America. More and more
areas of private activity, especially private commercial activity,
have fallen under government regulation. As this growth has oc-
curred, less virgin turf has remained into which government agen-
cies can expand. But government growth has been inexorable, and
the result has been, by design or otherwise, agency overlap-and
interagency conflict.1
The Symposium of which this Note is a part is designed to
evaluate areas in which poorly drafted legislation, overlapping
statutes and regulations, unclear foreign policy, and overlapping
agency jurisdiction impede U.S. exports, or fail to advance ex-
ports as intended. The other Notes present these governance prob-
lems in substantive areas and suggest ways to solve or lessen the
problems. In three of the areas studied,' interagency conflict is an
important component of the governance problem.
This Note, on the other hand, presents a theoretical, inter-
disciplinary' framework designed to facilitate understanding of in-
I That conflict is a normal by-product of interagency interactions is not to be doubted.
In A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1966), conflict is seen to be a function of "territorial
sensitivity." Downs stated that "every large organization is in partial conflict with every
other social agent it deals with." DOWNS. supra, at 216. This conflict is normal even where
one agency's interests are not being threatened by another; that is, even where its "ter-
ritory" is safe. This is because agencies have different "mind-sets" which cause them to
view problems very differently.
' See Note, United States Human Rights Policy: Effect on Exports, 9 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 287 (1979); Note, Export Licensing: Uncoordinated Trade Repression, 9 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 333 (1979); and Note, Through the Antiboycott Morass to an Export
Priority, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 357 (1979).
' Past attempts to categorize interagency interactions and their behavioral manifesta-
tions have been in large part one-dimensional; most efforts have generated a useful set of
contextual propositions which are often understood only within the author's discipline.
Legal analysis, for instance, has tended to focus on an agency's enabling legislation, its
written mandate from the legislature, and the regulations which emerge as an agency's
construction of how the legislature wanted to regulate. Unfortunately, these guidelines
(enabling legislation, written mandates, agency regulations) are often drawn with a
calculated imprecision, and correct interpretation may evade even the expert legal anlyst.
Similarly, psychological approaches have focused on variables relevant to that
discipline-the roles of motivation, personal environment and perception are emphasized
in focusing on the inner-dynamics of people within the agency. See R. F. SIMPSON.
THEORIES OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE (1972). Organizational behavorists also tend to focus on the
individual in his role in the organization. See E. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (1965).
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teragency conflict situations. The goal is to help the lawyer faced
with government interagency conflict to be aware of the forces at
work, the good and bad aspects of the situation and thus, to help
the lawyer predict the outcome. The premise of this Note is that a
broad understanding of the factors which contribute to interagency
conflict will help the practitioner to minimize the negative effects
and maximize the positive effects of these conflicts.
Section II of this Note presents a descriptive framework, in
practical and comprehensive terms, for understanding interagency
conflict. Nine variables' (only some of which may be relevant in a
given conflict) are explained in terms of their antecedents, conse-
quences and methods of measurement. The antecedents are in-
troduced in terms of the role they play in giving rise to the par-
ticular conflict variable at issue. The consequences on the other
hand are discussed for their value in helping the attorney faced
with conflict to predict the outcome when a given variable of con-
flict is present. As for measurement, where quantification is possi-
ble, the framework describes how it can be done and the type of
Sociologists and organizational theorists, on the other hand, use the organization in relation
to society as their unit of analysis. See BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE AND PERSONALITY
IN SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (R. Menton ed. 1957); Perrow, A Framework for
the Comparative Analysis of Organizations, 32 AM. Soc. R. 194 (1967); and J. THOMPSON,
ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967). Political economists follow a rational approach to decision-
making and use economic analysis to explain the bureaucracy. See A. DOWNS, note 1 supra.
Each of these disciplines has contributed insights to the phenomena of interagency con-
flict, many of which shall be drawn upon in this Note. In addition, these separate
disciplinary perspectives have demonstrated the shortcomings of all single disciplinary ap-
proaches. A multi-dimensional approach is thus the one taken here in attempting to develop
a comprehensive framework for analyzing interagency conflict. Such an approach is advo-
cated by John McIntyre, Rusk Center Fellow, University of Georgia School of Law, who
has done extensive research on the interagency decision-making process.
These variables were selected from a review of the multi-disciplinary literature on the
subject of bureaucratic and organizational relationship and conflict. It has been necessary
to omit some factors from the framework which undoubtedly explain or cause a great
number of conflicts among agencies but which were determined to be too unmanageable or
unpredictable to utilize in the conceptual scheme. Two factors omitted from the framework
are personality of agency actors and ideological and historical climate. The existence of per-
sonality clashes among agency actors presumably causes a great many conflict situations.
The existence of such clashes, however, does not prevent occasionally productive interations
characterized by a high degree of personal antagonism. Moreover, these clashes cannot
be adequately explained in general terms since individuals display different personality
characteristics depending on the nature of the other person's personality. An "interaction
grid" to explain personality clashes in interagency conflicts would be as disparate as the
people involved. See E. DALE. THE GREAT ORGANIZERS (1960).
Another variable omitted is the ideological and historical climate of the times
(Zeitgeist). There is no doubt that interagency conflict in particular instances would have
had different results in World War II than in, for example, the Depression of the 1930's or
the 1979 era of cutbacks in government. Not only is the mood of the people different, but
the mood of agency actors is different. Because of the unique nature of each historical era,
however, this variable does not lend itself to systematic analysis.
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information useful in doing so. Where it is not, ways are sug-
gested to understand the antecedent or consequence, sometimes
in the form of propositions, sometimes by suggesting outside sup-
port for the measurement's validity.
Section III of this Note is an application of the theoretical
framework and each of its variables to a particular interagency
conflict situation. The Export Promotion Program administered
by the Departments of Commerce and State is the example chosen.
II. NINE VARIABLES
A. Number of Agencies Involved
The first analytical variable in the conceptual scheme is the
number of agencies involved. The involvement of two or more
agencies in a given area is a sine qua non of interagency conflict.
It is a common sense notion, verified by experience, that the
greater the number of agencies involved, the greater the potential
for and likelihood of interagency conflict. Moreover, the conflict
situations which can be most systematically analyzed and assessed
are those generated by the simultaneous involvement of two or
more agencies in solving the same problems or regulating the
same matter.
Involvement of several agencies may occur in any number of
ways and may have different antecedent conditions. Typically, an
agency is given a designated role through various formal and in-
formal processes.' Generally, there is some written enabling
authority for the primary activities and responsibilities each agency
has, although the authorizing document may have uncertain legal
significance. Even in formal authorizing instruments there may be
no language spelling out the nature and type of involvement
which the agency is authorized to pursue. An enumeration of
general regulatory purposes and a listed set of powers and sanc-
tions are characteristics of the best documents authorizing agency
involvement in a given policy area. Such enumeration assures that
the agency's regulatory weapons are beyond question, while its
level of involvement and methods of implementation remain flexi-
ble enough to meet changing times and circumstances.
Because the agency creation process may be unclear, an
The formal and informal processes by which agencies are created are discussed in Sec-
tion II. A infra. As will be shown, the type of process by which an agency is created may in-
fluence interagency interactions.
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agency's internal construction of its mandate is often as vital a
determinant of its involvement in a given policy area as is its
enabling statute. This internal construction of the mandate can be
most effectively understood by looking at manifestations of agency
intention which differ in any way from the legislative authoriza-
tion. The most important of these manifestations of agency intent
include the internal memoranda circulated in the agency, inter-
agency memoranda, press releases or press conferences, Congres-
sional testimony by agency actors, agency pronouncements and
policy statements transmitted by the media, and agency posture
in trade publications.
A determination of the number of agencies involved in a given
area helps focus attention on the formal and informal processes
which create the agency and describe its purpose, and on the
agencies' internal construction of how these representations of
legislative or executive intention might best be implemented.
A final measurement of agency involvement is simply the
number and type of interactions an agency has with a given
clientele, regardless of the express or implied legal authority to so
interact with the client in that policy area. Agencies frequently
become involved in new policy areas when their clients have ac-
tivities and interests in those areas. The agency's interest in the
client may be thus transformed into a new policy interest vis-a-vis
the various other activities in which the client is involved.6
What are the consequences of a number of agencies becoming
involved in the same policy area? When the number of agencies is
great, there are several detrimental consequences to policy forma-
tion. As the number increases, there are greater difficulties in col-
lecting and utilizing information. Communication among the agen-
cies involved becomes more complex and clients are besieged with
a bewildering variety of agency requests and requirements. Inter-
' An example is the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) regulatory function regarding
the farmer/client. The USDA is involved in setting parity levels to assure farm prices which
will adequately compensate farmers. This indirect method of income assurance or subsidiza-
tion for the farmer-client tends to induce USDA involvement in a vast number of low-
income subsidy programs involving some farmers but run by other government agencies,
especially since the receipt of benefits from one such program will be conditioned on
eligibility or non-eligibility in other programs. USDA's mandate to implement a series of
target prices for agricultural commodities is thus transmuted, via an agency interest in ade-
quate income for farmers, into a broad policy interest in all other agency programs for low-
income persons. Likewise, the USDA role in the Food Stamp program may give it a policy
involvement in all other programs involving Food Stamp recipients. See Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Agricultural Research and General Legislation of the Senate Comm. on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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agency communications must be formalized and often become
stylized into consolidated formats, resulting in great time cost.
New methods and mechanisms must be introduced to coordinate
functions and policy, including interagency task forces, staff coor-
dinating groups, and policy exchange mechanisms to coordinate
disparate goals. In simple terms, more committees and paperwork
become necessary. Ultimately, the large number of agencies
creates great informational difficulties. Collection and transmis-
sion of information may in fact become an end in itself, leading to
redundant performance of tasks. Moreover, as the number of
agencies involved increases, there are a greater number of deci-
sions which must be made, and hence a greater number of conflict
points.' At a threshold level, informational overload results, and
each agency becomes less aware of the other agencies' activities.
Ultimately, all of this lost or ignored information results in client
confusion and frustration.
Unfortunately, the consequences above have become an all too
familiar bureaucratic model to citizens and businesses in the
United States who deal with federal agencies. For the victims of
multi-agency involvement, there are a greater number of pro-
cedures to follow and regulations to comply with. Different forms
and a variety of paperwork requirements emerge from the dif-
ferent agency requests for information. Time delays are expected
concomitants in an agency process featuring a large number of
agencies. These delays may in fact be the most obvious
characteristic of multi-agency involvement.
Another way to conceptualize the consequences is to examine
the mode and type of communication channels which have been
created for agencies and their clientele. When a great number of
agencies are involved there is typically no one channel through
which all agency actors can communicate simultaneously. Even
though victims of multi-agency involvement may have many chan-
nels to the government, the existing channels may not be useful
for obtaining information or effective in registering complaints or
pointing out problems. The existing channels are usually not the
type needed for effective communication; the receiver of the com-
munication cannot evoke the desired response. Because of the
' See E. BARDACH. THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME 52 (1977). Ideally, a consolidated decision-
making apparatus would result in fewer conflicts than one where individual agencies make
independent decisions, ignoring other agencies. But as the number of agencies is increased,
a point is reached where the number of conflict points becomes essentially unmanageable,
and the conflict points are ignored by necessity.
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many burdens placed on clients in the multi-agency paradigm, and
the limited ability to effectively communicate, it is easy to under-
stand why there would be problems associated with the sheer
number of agencies involved.'
B. Jurisdictional Boundaries
A second variable vital in analyzing interagency conflict is the
setting of jurisdictional boundaries. Ambiguous boundaries be-
tween and among agencies may create confusion on the part of
agencies and regulated parties. They may also lead to jockeying
among agencies for position and to greater potential for conflict.
Clearly drawn boundaries, on the other hand, ought to enhance
agency governance.
Boundaries may be set by formal or informal processes. Formal
processes include enabling statutes, Congressional directives
and statements of agency purpose, executive orders, judicial deci-
sions,9 and legislative history. The chief advantage of jurisdic-
tional boundaries which are created by formal processes is that
there is an external, written source of authority by which to
measure the scope of agency power.10
Unfortunately, not all written sources of agency authority are
perfectly clear. The consequence of ambiguity is that greater
potential for conflict over interpretation of authority arises due to
the difficulty of assigning credit or blame to individual agencies
for policy decisions. As a result, the risk that no one is accountable
' For a discussion of some of the problems of interagency action in the context of Export
Administration, see Note, Through the Antiboycott Morass to an Export Priority, 9 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 357 (1979).
1 A variety of Constitutional questions, beyond the scope of the Note, may be presented
in the field of interagency relations. The most likely area of litigation is due process for
those subject to inconsistent regulatory demands in cases where a recognized liberty or
property interest is taken as a result of noncompliance and where agency action involved
an unconstitutional classification. Cf. Milus v. Hills, 588 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1978).
10 The importance of this external source can be easily overstated. The legal significance
of written standards will vary, depending on the source and context in which the standards
were written. Even binding legal documents in the agency jurisdiction area may be of
limited utility to a party subjected to agency regulation, since imprecise language and in-
hospitable judicial fora make challenges to agency authority difficult to sustain. Broad
discretion for agency actions continues to be the judicial norm. See Zenith Radio Corpora-
tion v. United States, 437 U.S. 433 (1978). In that case a Treasury practice dating back to
1898, failing to assess countervailing duties for non-excessive remissions of excise taxes,
was upheld in a unanimous decision by the Supreme Court. The Court stated that "an ad-
ministrative practice has peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction
of a statute by the persons charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in mo-
tion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and
new," id. at 450.
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emerges. All agencies claiming authority may regulate
simultaneously according to their perceptions of the written docu-
ment. Where formal guidelines are the chief boundaries, they
must be clearly drawn, they must delegate function and authority,
they must be understandable and they must be accepted by the
agencies involved; otherwise, interactions among the agencies in-
volved will be non-productive.
What is a clearly drawn jurisdictional guideline or authorizing
instrument? A number of measurement standards can be posited.
One straightforward test is a reading of the instrument itself,
calculated to determine whether the guideline can be reasonably
understood on its face. If a broad historical understanding of the
problem addressed is necessary for an understanding of the man-
date or guideline, it is probable that there are in fact different
historical understandings. One might compare academic treatises
on the subject area to an agency's own understanding of the
historical sequence leading to its creation.The specificity, completeness and commitment of legislative
enactments in directing administrative agencies to achieve their
purposes can be called statutory stringency." It has been sug-
gested that the following factors are most relevant in assessing
.statutory stringency: program objectives, geographic scope of
program coverage, precision of program coverage, exempted ac-
tivities, activities of other government agencies (pre-emption),
program approval criteria, burden of proof, administrative
criteria for continuing the program, mandatory development con-
ditions, primary enforcement responsibility, citizen enforcement
responsibility, administrative enforcement responsibility and
sanctions for noncompliance (fines, jail terms, injunctions, etc.),"
and judicial oversight. 8
Agency boundaries, responsibilities and powers are often set by
H Rosenbaum, Protecting the Nations' Wetlands: An Assessment of State Regulatory
Statutes (The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., Working Paper 1236-02, 1978).
12 Id.
" Lawyers will recognize the unique role the courts play in overseeing administrative
decision-making. See note 10 supra. Courts show great deference to administrative deter-
minations and practices, and even policy-making, see Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965),
particularly where there has been acquiescence over time by the legislative branch. Ad-
ministrative fora are viewed by many courts as serving quasi-judicial functions, and deter-
minations made there are only reluctantly overturned. Usually they are reversed only if
they are deemed to be "unreasonable" constructions of legislative purpose. The burden of
proof is typically placed on the party challenging the determination or practice to show
such unreasonableness. See note 9 supra.
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informal as opposed to formal processes. These informal processes
include custom or practice acquiesced in by Congress, inter-office
arrangements, liaison procedures and an internal construction of
the organizational mandate which is not effectively challenged. 14
Where informal processes are recognized and accepted by agency
actors at a level beyond the personalities which created them,
they can be quite effective in dividing policy areas among several
agencies. Informal processes are most effective when a consensus
exists by agreement or by action by one agency and tacit accep-
tance by another as to how an area should be divided. When an
agency has formal authority to carry out policy, but lacks the ef-
fective implementing powers, it has an incentive to effectuate an
informal partnership with a related agency possessing such
power. 5 In most cases, there must exist some outside incentive,
calculated to counteract agency self-interest, to make such infor-
mal divisions work.'6 While it is difficult to "measure" the conse-
quences of informal processes, it is accurate to note that where in-
formal practices have been accepted over time they are similar to
formal guidelines and may be similarly viewed and understood."
C. Power Principles
A third important factor in interagency conflict analysis is
" The power and influence held by an agency's clientele can play an important role in
the shaping of informal boundaries. If the client has political power or prestige in Con-
gress, it may be able to influence the formation of formal boundaries by lobbying efforts.
The influence, if its exists to such a degree, may be used as a bargaining chip to influence
agencies involved in simultaneous regulation to divide boundaries informally and consen-
sually. The structure of the client's activities may influence informal decisions as well,
such as where the client is a business engaged in resource production, manufacturing and
marketing.
11 For a discussion of how agencies are motivated by self-perpetuation goals, see Sec-
tion II. C infra.
14 A number of consensus-inducing factors exist. While direct threats to survival tend
to turn the agency inward to fight for continued existence, more subtle threats to restrict
funds or reduce activities may induce cooperation in dividing jurisdiction with other agen-
cies. Agency heads may wish not to personally antagonize clients who may be future
employers, and may thereby be induced to divide regulatory responsibilities with other
agencies. A division may promise to transfer, in effect, the power devices of one agency to
another. Agencies may informally divide jurisdiction in a policy area where such action
might promise to quiet publicized problems under existing jurisdictional guidelines.
"T Informal practices or customs approach the weight of more formal law when they are
accepted over a long period of time. The role of agency regulation is perhaps most clear in
the tax area, where litigated questions often resolve around the validity of an Internal
Revenue Code Regulation. Cf. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 229, 307 (1967), Bingler v.
Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-751 (1969), and Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333
U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
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power, or the relative power that each agency in an interaction
possesses. For regulated parties, an agency's power to enforce its
mandate is naturally a crucial consideration. In interagency con-
flicts however, more than enforcement power alone is involved in
measuring the power of a given agency. Power principles are
those aspects of a government agency such as money, personnel
and support that give it clout and allow this clout to be utilized in
pursuit of agency interests.
An obvious antecedent of power in at least any capitalist society
is money. An agency's financial clout may be measured rather
simply at one level by the amount of money the agency receives
from legislative appropriations, and the percentage of funds it
receives from such appropriations. As an agency's funding in-
creases, important policy actors in both the public and private sec-
tors begin to seek and obtain a variety of stakes and interests in
agency operations and survival. The more visible actors in this
process are Congressional committee members, who have over-
sight functions vis-a-vis the agency involved, and the clientele of
the agency, who seek to lobby and influence their regulatory do-
main. The agency's own staff, being in sole possession of frequent-
ly complex and important facts, seeks to utilize this intelligence as
an incentive, tool, or weapon, depending on the surrounding
climate. 18
An increasingly large number of enterprises rely on contracts
with agencies in an expanding number of areas. The number of
jobs dependent on an agency, both by internal hiring and by
private sector contracting, is thus an important part of financial
clout. The most reliable measure of job dependency involves an
assessment of the economic implications of contracts between
agencies and the private sector. The agency payroll and the
payrolls of affiliated corporate enterprises are further indicators
of dependency. The more jobs which depend on the continuity of
agency functions, the more potential power an agency has. 9
IS Agency data-collecting functions are discussed in Section II. E, infra. The agency's
possession of complex data which is often indecipherable to outsiders gives it a unique
power when it is forced to justify its actions and time expended. The use of separate
forms by different agencies, containing the same information, but often organized in dif-
ferent ways, may be at least partially explained by the differing use each agency has for
given information.
1" An agency's job dependency factor is "potential" power only because the effective
clout generated is extremely hard to measure. The clout may be diminished or enhanced by
competing policy interests, the state of the economy, the political environment, etc. In any
case, the number of jobs dependent on an agency is important, even if used only as a "scare
19791
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Another power principle involves the agency's available
methods of assuring compliance with its regulatory edicts. These
compliance mechanisms or sanctions may be assessed by a four-
step inquiry into (a) the number of available sanctions (b) the type
of sanctions (c) the willingness to use sanctions and (d) the actual
use of sanctions. Viewing sanctions as ways to insure compliance
and effectuate agency policies, an agency with more sanctions
should have a stronger claim to a policy area than other agencies
with interests in the same area but with fewer and weaker sanc-
tions."°
Agency prestige can mean power as well. The vital prestige com-
ponent to agencies involves relationships with the legislature. Con-
gress' disposition towards an agency and its responses to agency
requests over time are the most reliable ways to measure this
prestige factor."' This legislative disposition can be quantified by
analyzing annual budget increases or decreases, by examining ex-
pansion or contraction of available sanctions, and by comparing
executive requests for agency budgets with the budgets ultimate-
ly authorized by Congress.
One cannot dispose of the topic of agency power without
discussing the motives and behavior patterns of government
tactic" in the political arena (notwithstanding the fact that the nexus between agency ac-
tivities and employment attributed to them is a somewhat tenuous one). In industries heavily
dependent on government contracts, such as the aerospace and defense industries, a nexus
is clearly noticeable in the layoffs and dislocations which follow rejected projects. It is
nonetheless difficult to determine exactly how many jobs would not exist but for govern-
ment contracts or agency activities; the number of executed contracts may reflect only
economic factors in the private sector. Still, an important way to conceptualize the power
an agency possesses is to ask how many people would lose their jobs or be temporarily
dislocated if an agency were abolished or its funds were cut.
o Once again reality is far more complex than the posited proposition. Certain types of
sanctions may be far more effective weapons in an agency's arsenal than others, as to both
compliance effectuation and power in interagency interactions. Moreover, the same set of
complicated deterrence equations which intrigue defense policy analysis may play impor-
tant roles in agency interactions as well. For example, weapons which are never
used, and weapons which are used too often and ineffectively, will lose their credibility as
deterrence mechanisms. By analogy, sanctions never imposed are idle threats; sanctions
used too often, unless consistently effective, will not be feared but will induce balancing by
those subject to the sanctions between probable costs and benefits of compliance versus
non-compliance. Balancing is too risky an approach where sanctions are used wisely, i.e.,
sparingly and with effectiveness.
" It is important to differentiate the. treatment of agency requests over time (which in-
cludes funding requests, requests for additional sanctions and requests for new legislation)
from the requests contained in budget statements in any given year. The prestige factor in-
volves a broad legislative disposition to deal with certain policy problems in certain
ways-i.e., by agency oversight and regulation. While funding is an important part of this,
and is easy to measure, it is not the only factor encompassed by prestige.
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bureaucracies. An understanding of agency motivation and
behavior is especially important for those who deal with govern-
ment regularly. Anthony Downs has developed a model of ter-
ritorial relations in which are incorporated features of a number
of models to explain bureaucratic behavior." Downs explains the
relationships existing between and among agencies according to
the concept of "bureau territoriality."' The policy space" surround-
ing each of an agency's functional areas is divided into three ter-
ritorial zones. 5 The degree of dominance that the agency exer-
cises in each portion of policy space determines how the zones are
drawn."
In the first of these three zones, the "interior," a bureau exer-
cises the dominant role over social policy. The interior consists of
two sub-zones, the "heartland," in which the bureau is the sole
determinant of policy, and the "interior fringe," in which it is
dominant but subject to the influence of other bureaus. In "no
man's land," no single bureau is dominant but many have some in-
fluence. The "exterior" is the third territorial zone. It, like the in-
terior, is subdivided into two zones. In the "periphery," a bureau
has some influence in policy space where another is dominant. In
"alien territory," it has no influence at all. The heartland of any
bureau is alien territory to all other bureaus.'
Uncertainty permeates both bureau boundaries and policy
space due to the complex nature of society. This creates an "inces-
sant jockeying . . . as each bureau struggles to defend or extend
the existing borders of its various territorial zones. '"28 Bureaus
DOWNS, supra note 1, at 211-12.
" Id. at 211.
"If we imagine that a given social function (such as eliminating poverty) is located
somewhat in n-dimensional space, we can conceive of its relationships with other
functions in terms of relative proximity. The basic measure of distance along any
dimension of this space is degree of interdependence. We can use an infinite
number of dimensions to measure the proximity of different organizations, since
any variable or relation that can be applied to all of them forms a dimension. We
can then focus upon the specific dimensions appropriate to our analysis.
Each social function performed by a bureau has a certain location in policy
space in relation to the functions of other bureaus. The function has the location,
not the bureau. Hence a bureau with many functions has many simultaneous loca-
tions in policy space. The whole set of these locations can be referred to as the
bureau's location, but the "space" we are talking about is policy space not
organization space." Id. at 212.
" Id. at 213.
2 Id.
" Id.
u Id at 215.
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thus are sensitive to invasions, and the dynamics of change assure
that each bureau will become a "territorial imperialist." Excessive
territorial sensitivity causes "socially irrational inertia" and the
adoption of "specifically irrational forms of change."" To minimize
conflicts engendered thereby, bureaus either narrow their actions
to effect fewer external agents, or more commonly, ignore all
other social agents in designing proposals and carrying these pro-
posals out without regard to the interests of those other agents. 1
Ultimately, agencies take insufficient advantage of real in-
terdependencies or adopt highly unrealistics policies not adjusted
to the limitations of their agents and bureaus.'
To summarize then, there are five antecedents to power in
agency interactions. These are an agency's position in policy
space, its financial clout, its methods of assuring compliance, the
number of jobs dependent on the agency and the prestige the
agency holds. Each of these may be measured in a variety of ways,
and as a group they generate a number of consequences. First,
agencies are motivated to use their resources to resist en-
croachments from other agencies into their policy space and to
carve out new territory for themselves. Second, as agency funding
increases, policy actors obtain important interests in agency
operations and survival. Third, the agency with the most
resources or the highest "power quotient"3' will be most effective
in asserting its interests over the interests of other agencies.
Id. at 216, 217.
Id at 217. Downs calls this the "Shrinking Violet Syndrome," which results in leaving
government economies of scale unexploited. Buffeted by fast and fierce adverse feedback
from other agencies, agency actors oversensitive to criticism adopt more narrowly focused
programs and policies. By avoiding feedback from other involved agencies, the "shrinking
violet" appears to be efficient but in fact takes no advantage of the resources of other agen-
cies.
81 Id at 217-18. Downs calls this the "Superman Syndrome." This allows agency actors to
avoid the difficulties of adjusting policy to the real demands of other agencies. Such actors
never check with other agencies to find out whether their assumptions are feasible, and
"grandiose but impractical policy formation" results. For an example of this syndrome, see
Note, Through the Antiboycott Morass to an Export Priority 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 357
(1979), for discussion of Justice Department's Antitrust Division reaction to criticisms of
the Bechtel Decree vis-a-vis inconsistencies created between antitrust law and the Export
Administration Amendment and Regulations.
Id at 217.
" "Power quotient" means the total power an agency has when all its bases for power
are accumulated. In a mathematical sense, the choice of the term "quotient" is unfortuante
and incorrect. There is assuredly no way to specify a number which correlates to this
power. The best time to determine an agency's total real power comes in time of crisis,
when all competing interest groups, financial largesse, and individual and group resources
emerge on one side or the other as to agency actions.
[Vol. 9:241
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Fourth, agencies with sanctions available and wisely used have
stronger claims to the same policy space vis-a-vis other agencies
not having such sanctions. Fifth, the more jobs dependent on an
agency, the more potential power is held by the agency.
Finally, the consequences enumerated above may be best
understood by asking these questions: (a) how close to an agency's
interior policy space does an area lie? (b) who supports the agency,
publicly and privately, and how is this support manifested? (c)
what is an agency's bargaining stance with other agencies in rela-
tion to its power resources? (d) what sort of media exposure does
an agency receive, assuming that its use of sanctions will be
typically considered to be "news"? and (e) how many people would
lose their jobs, or be dislocated, by abatement in agency funding?
D. Work Environment
The work environment of any agency is unique. An understand-
ing of the relevant components of this environment will have im-
portant implications for predicting an agency's effectiveness in
handling interagency conflict.
Every agency spends a certain amount of its time performing
routine tasks through standard operating procedures. This in-
cludes filling out and maintaining forms, producing reports, and
preparing budgets. Standard operating procedures allow large
numbers of agency personnel to deal with numerous chores rather
mechanically.8 In contrast to this routine approach to tasks is an
agency's orientation towards a broader perspective on gathering,
using and disseminating information that it not limited to stand-
ard responses. The different extent to which each agency en-
courages its actors to use non-routine procedures and approaches
in -solving problems as opposed to standard operating procedures
is one antecedent to interagency conflict.
One measure of this factor is the percentage of time each agency
spends in collecting and processing routine data and information.,
Internal agency procedures and reporting requirements are a
direct measure of the agency's pre-occupation with standard
operating procedures. A determination of the amount of discre-
tion given agency actors for implementing policy is another means
84 G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION 89 (1971).
A major criticism of agency functions is that the ever-increasing amount of time spent
on routine is time wasted on trivia. Id.
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of understanding this idea. The extent to which agency actors are
given the discretion to develop new approaches to problem-
solving is not readily measured unless such a policy is the written
rule or is expressly understood by the agency actors and can be
ascertained by observation or interview.N Another indicator of
this discretion factor is the percentage of agency actors who are
employed as staff personnel as opposed to line personnel. 7
Consequently, the more an agency focuses on standard pro-
cedures in its everyday performance of tasks, the more sluggish
and less flexible is the agency's response to situations not
amenable to such standard responses." Prime examples of such
non-standard situations are policy tasks over which several agen-
cies have jurisdiction and authority. In their approach to this
conflict-producing subject-matter, the overriding concern of agen-
cies devoting a large percentage of time to routine procedures is
the ultimate effect the interagency interaction will have on
routine procedures. Conflict here is likely to be non-productive if
the interaction is between similarly operated agencies or with
agencies which are predominantly policy-oriented. The latter sort
of agency tends to give its actors broader latitudes in the interac-
tion, so that a creative, flexible response to interagency conflict
with the goal of achieving a policy outcome is possible.
Assessments of the approaches of agency actors in the interac-
" The Internal Revenue Service is one agency well-known for its multitude of regula-
tions governing the taxability of income. Athough agency actors apply many of these
regulations in a mechanical fashion to determine a taxpayer's tax liability, some of these
regulations call for a considerable amount of discretion by agency actors. One notable exam-
ple is the determination of the valuation of land. I.R.S. The Audit Technique Handbook for
Estate Tax Examiners, 250 Basic Considerations, reprinted in D. KAHN and L. WAGGONER,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF GIFTS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 72 (1977) directs that:
It is your job to recommend the fair market value of the property. Recognize that
in the absence of actual sales the matter of valuation is one of opinion. Therefore,
maintain a sense of proportion and exercise sound discretion and judgment in ar-
riving at your recommendation. Do not recommend extremes! If your investiga-
tion shows that the returned value is essentially correct, recommend it. Slight dif-
ferences based upon opinions of qualified experts should not be the basis for
change. However, a sale, reflecting fair market value and made within a
reasonable time of the valuation date, would be a proper basis for change even
though the change might not be substantial.
Although many differences between line and staff personnel in an agency are more
theoretical than real, Downs believes that staff are more prone to innovation than line ac-
tors. DOWNS. supra note 1, at 154-55.
1 ALLISON, supra note 34, at 83. This consequence is further supported by Harold Laski's
description of the signifying characteristics of a bureaucracy as "a passion for routine in ad-
ministration, the sacrifice of flexibility to rule, delay in the making of decisions and a
refusal to embark on experiment." B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 44 (1977).
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tion and of agencies' responses to the conflict are relevant in
analyzing this consequence of the work environment. These same
measures are applicable to the other consequences of the work en-
vironment and will not be separately discussed. Although these
measures are somewhat vague in directing one in how to make an
analysis, a skilled administrative lawyer should be able to detect
weaknesses and strengths within agencies as to their work en-
vironment and then be able to extrapolate agencies' potential for
success or failure in interagency relations.
A second antecedent or cause of interagency conflict is the dif-
fering levels and types of supervision exercised over agency ac-
tors by their respective agencies. This antecedent is related to the
one discussed above, since agencies with a greater focus on
routine procedures tend to have stricter supervision to insure
compliance and standardization.
One useful measure of supervisory oversight is an examination
of the established hierarchy of command through queries as to
whether the lines of command are clear and understood by the
agency actors and as to whether the actors' task assignments are
unambiguous. The strictness of supervision can be measured by
investigating the type of disciplinary action taken against
violators of standard operating procedures and the stringency of
this action.
Several consequences for interagency conflict result from the
supervision antecedent. First, as the supervision increases and
becomes more hierarchical, the basis for interaction across agen-
cies is narrower. Second, the time lag in getting permission for
proposals and commitments is greater because the actors in the
interaction must defer to their superiors, unless the actors involved
are at the top of the hierarchy. This time lag problem may be
offset, however, for the greater the supervision, the greater the
certainty that the approved proposals represent the highest levels
of the agency hierarchy. From this certainty it follows that the ap-
proved proposals will be reflected in action and that the agency's
policy will remain constant. Thus, as these last two consequences
demonstrate, more supervision and hierarchical control can have
positive implications for policy formulation. However, the two
other consequences mentioned, a narrow basis of interaction and
time lag for getting permission, show that the supervision factor
may also yield nonproductive implications for interagency con-
flict.
1979] 255
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
The satisfaction of agency employees, both program and staff, is
another antecedent to the work environment variable. The less
that employees are satisfied with their work situation, the greater
the internal conflict and energies consumed in dealing with dissen-
sion can be expected. 9 In turn, if the agency expends much of its
time and energy in internal bickering, it is less likely to engage in
interagency interactions at all. If such an agency's authority or
jurisdiction over one of its policy areas is shared by another agency
and conflict emerges in policy implementation, the agency with in-
ternal employee dissatisfaction will tend to be weak and ineffec-
tive in representing and implementing its policy position with
respect to the other agencies' positions. On the other hand, the
better the esprit de corps, productivity, efficiency and respon-
siveness of an agency (all signs of a positive work environment),
the more aggressive the agency is likely to be in interagency rela-
tions and the more effective it should be in securing a dominant
role for its policy position.
In order to measure employee satisfaction, it would be helpful
to make a comprehensive observation of employees in their work
environment. Some traces of employee satisfaction might include
a high morale and esprit de corps among all levels of the agency,
efficiency in daily operations, a quick and thorough response to
problems and conflicts, and a high degree of productivity. Low
turnover and a high job interest are other indices.89 Additional
signs of employee satisfaction can be gleaned from a measure of
the number of conflicts between program and staff actors and
from the type of disciplinary action taken against staff employees
for violating standard operating procedures and agency rules.
Another concept applicable to each of the antecedents of the
work environment variable-(1) focus on standard operating pro-
cedures versus broad discretion, (2) supervision, and (3) employee
satisfaction-is a historical survey of the variations in these
measures over an agency's history. Knowledge of an agency's past
work conditions should aid in understanding its present conditions
and in predicting its future work environment.
Agencies' varying degrees of emphasis on standard operating
procedures, different types of supervision, and different levels of
employee satisfaction make each agency's work environment uni-
que. The more differentiation there is among agencies in these
Walton and Dutton, The Management of Interdepartmental Conflict: A Model and
Review, 14 AD. Sci. Q. 77 (1969).
Seiler, Diagnosing Interdepartmental Conflict, 41 HARV. Bus. R. 124 (1963).
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elements of the work environment, the more potential there is for
conflict in their interagency relations,' assuming that an agency's
particular work environment affects its relationships with other
agencies.
E. Point of View or Mind-Set
Dominant characteristics of each agency (or sub-agency) tend to
create a particular "point of view" or "mind-set"'2 which dis-
tinguishes it from other agencies and describes the agency's
approach in the policy implementation process. The dissimilarity
of agencies' "mind-sets" is commonly heralded as a source of con-
flict between agencies. Moreover, the agency "mind-set" may
create a barrier between the individual agency and the entities
which are regulated by the agency.
A number of factors contribute to the total "mind-set" of the
agency. Factors based on the background of the agency actors in-
clude the actors' skills and training. Agencies increasingly de-
mand specialists in the particular fields in which their tasks are
concentrated. There has been a marked trend to employ more and
more scientists in the top level of the Civil Service; generalists
such as politicians, lawyers, and businessmen are employed to a
lesser extent.'3 For any agency job, certain minimum educational
and technical training levels in explicit areas of expertise are re-
quired. The agency's mean bureaucratic level is determined by a
composite of such factors.
Agencies also have their own preferences in regard to their
employees' aspirations and leanings, such as pro-consumer or pro-
labor preferences. An antecedent directly contributing to whether
an agency will be successful in employing actors with similar
" Lawrence and Lorsch conclude, however, from their study of six plastics firms, that
even though the potential for conflict increases the more internal differences there are bet-
ween the units of each organization, one cannot assume that more manifest conflict
automatically results. Lawrence and Lorsch, Differentiation and Integration in Complex
Organization, 12 AD. SCI. Q. 1 (1967). As Pondy points out in his study of organizational con-
flict, conflict is often resolved or deterred before it reaches the level of non-cooperative
behavior. Pondy, Organizational Conflict- Concepts and Models, 12 AD. Sci. Q. 504 (1967).
" Even though "mind-set" usually connotes a more all-encompassing attitude then
"point of view," the two terms are used interchangeably here to describe an agency's over-
riding way of "looking at things," i.e. which viewpoint is shared by a sizable majority of the
agency actors.
" D. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE 60-61 (1965). Staff personnel tend to be more
technically trained, better educated, and younger than line personnel, thus creating the
possibility of intra-agency conflict or tension between the two groups. DOWNS, supra note 1,
at 155.
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viewpoints to its own and in strengthening its agency "mind-set"
is the agency's mode of recruitment. Important factors include
areas (such as the private sector or universities) from which an
agency solicits employees, the barriers an agency erects to block
potential candidates from employment, and the tests (such as civil
service exams) that must be passed to secure employment.
Another "mind-set" factor is the agency's mode of operation, in-
cluding licensing, regulation, management, and largesse, depen-
ding on the broad objectives of the laws governing the agency's
operation."
There are several concrete ways in which the enumerated fac-
tors contributing to an agency's overriding point of view can be
measured. For one, a survey of agency actor's backgrounds, in-
cluding their education, technical skills and training, and socio-
economic status, can be made to ascertain whether there are
similar characteristics for actors within a certain agency and if
there are, what this common background is. A more focused
survey of the background of the agency actors directly involved
with the conflict can be compared with the general survey to
determine whether the smaller group of actors are an
"aberration" within the agency. Interviews, either personal or
through questionnaires, are a means of supplying data on per-
sonality characteristics of agency actors. A percentage com-
parison of an agency's scientific types to its generalist types can
be taken. Finally, agency publications are a revealing source of a
particular agency's viewpoint. Recruitment publications are
especially useful in determining an agency's "mind-set" because
the descriptions of what types of people the agency wants to hire
reflect either the types of people already employed or the
agency's dissatisfaction with its present employees and its aspira-
tions to hire new ones to conform to the desired "mind-set."
Different "points of view" or "mind-sets" of agencies have
significant consequences for the understanding of conflict created
" A breakdown of agencies into these different functions is the best means of explaining
this category. Licensing agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission are in-
volved in comprehensive control of certain industry sectors through regulations im-
plemented to achieve high levels of industry uniformity. Regulatory agencies such as the
Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission do not have such
comprehensive control of an industry. The Forest Service is an example of government
management of its own resources. Government largesse is traditionally associated with
those agencies dealing with welfare and transfer payments. F. HUSZAGH. SURVEY OF MAJOR
FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS THAT CONTROL EXPORT TRADE, SEMINAR ON EXPORT TRADE
REGULATION 7 (Rusk Center, University of Georgia School of Law 1978).
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in interagency relationships. First, if agencies do not talk the
same language, fundamental communication problems are bound
to arise when agencies try to settle problems of overlap. Even if
agencies are willing to cooperate with each other, if each agency
has a basically dissimilar approach to problems, cooperation can
be frustrated unless each agency has a thorough understanding of
other agencies' peculiar "mind-sets." Another consequence is that
disparate agency "mind-sets" can make it difficult to arrive at con-
sistent policy outcomes. 5 Moreover, when agencies have different
viewpoints of both the nature of problems' 6 and their solutions,
the conflict likely to result will rarely be productive, as power
principles will dominate the struggle between agencies-each
agency asserts that its own views are the "right" ones and should
prevail.'7
The working of these power principles is also evident in the
relationships between agencies with different "mind-sets" and the
private sector areas the agencies are seeking to regulate. If two
or more agencies with different "mind-sets" are involved in
regulating a particular private sector area whose business orien-
tation is not shared by the regulating agencies, each agency will
seek to impose its own point-of-view as the dominant one and
create its own power base." In the interagency struggle, the
private sector's interests are ignored unless the private sector
has learned to speak at least one of the agencies' languages. If the
private sector does so, a reinforcing relationship could develop
between the private sector and the agency as the agency relies on
the private sector for its external support base and the private
The possible incentives discussed in footnote 7 are less useful in motivating agencies to
cooperate in their interactions.
An example of conflicting viewpoints in approaching common problems is seen with
the prevalent problem of inflation. A labor-oriented agency might identify the problem as
high business profits, while a business-oriented agency might view government spending,
increases in the money supply, and high wages as key problems.
' See Section II. C, Power Principles, supra.
An example of this problem arose in the mining industry. A mining company had
entered into an agreement with an Indian tribe to provide for the development of a new
copper mine on their reservation. Since the reservation fell under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the agreement had to be approved by the BIA and the
Secretary of the Interior. The BIA was ready to grant approval when it was decided that
since the reservation was under the custody of the government, an environmental impact
statement would have to be filed and accepted. Four years later, this statement has yet to
be corqpleted as archaelogists, zoologists, federal and state historical preservation groups,
and a number of other government agencies claiming jurisdiction of some parts of the pro-
ject have shackled it. Thompson, Regulation- Can We Survive,? 64 MINING CONG. J. 43
(1972).
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sector relies on the agency to look out for its interests. The ob-
vious danger here is of collusion between the regulated and the
regulators. 9
Measures of the consequences of disparate agency "mind-sets"
for interagency conflict are more assessable than for many other
variables. Weekly news magazines and other media sources like to
report bickering between agencies and the private sector's pro-
blems in dealing with agencies. 5° Business publications provide in-
sights into the private sector's problems with agencies.5' Congres-
sional hearings on problem areas describe conflict and elucidate
the consequences of the differing points of view of the various
agencies.5' In addition, interviews with agency actors can help
determine what agency actors view as problems and the effects of
these viewpoints on conflict and collaboration between agencies.
F. Personal Identification with the Agency
Another variable which is relevant to an analysis of interagency
conflict is the agency actors' identification with the agency.
Establishment of an identifying nexus between the employee and
his agency is often dependent on the career objectives of the per-
son hired by the agency. If a candidate's career objective is to
move up the hierarchical ladder in a particular agency to a top
agency position, or at least to seek long-term employment with
" One description of the nature of the relationship between the regulating agency and
the regulated is that "[ojver the years there develops a relationship which can be described
only as regulatory symbiosis: regulators and regulated have learned to live with each other
and have, in fact, grown intimately dependent on each other." Evan, Administrative Law
and Organization Theory, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 113 (1973).
"o Business regulated by the Federal Trade Commission voiced its complaints over the
FTC's stringent new policies and regulation procedures. FTC Under Fire, NEWSWEEK,
December 4, 1978 at 93.
" A study by Business Round Table (an organization of chief executives of major U.S.
corporations) of 48 corporation members concluded that the federal regulations of six agen-
cies cost those companies $2.6 billion per year. As pointed out by an analysis of the study in
BUSINESS WEEK, one of the shortcomings of the study was its concentration on the cost of
the regulations to business and its lack of attention to the benefits of these regulations. A
Start at Auditing the Cost of Regulation, Bus. WEEK, March 26, 1979, 30, 34.
" One example of such hearings, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Con-
sumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977), focuses on the problem of export promotion. The conflicting roles of the
State and Commerce Departments in this area will be discussed infra in Section III of this
Note, APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK: EXPORT PROMOTION PROGRAM. Usually, however, there
is little direct discussion about interagency conflict in Congressional hearings due to Con-
gress' role (i.e., Congress is not a mediator) and to the tendency of agencies to deny conflict
in their interactions. For conflict to surface in these hearings, therefore, it must be over a
serious, publicly-disclosed problem.
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the agency, then the candidate can be typed a careerist.' On the
other hand, if the member's ultimate career objective is not tied
to this particular agency or he is only seeking short-term employ-
ment, then he can be considered a transient."
Measures of the careerist versus transient factor include examin-
ing who is promoted by agencies through a comparison of agency
employees near the top of the agency with those near the bottom
of the agency and examining the agency's turn-over rate to deter-
mine the percentage of long-term as opposed to short-term
employees. Background information on agency personnel' and the
nature of the employees' jobs are useful for ascertaining the
career objectives of agency personnel.
Interagency conflict is usually more difficult to resolve when
the agency actors are careerists. This consequence develops
from the relationship between the agency and careerists." Agen-
cies tending to employ careerists can apply the potent weapon of
job security and promotion to assure compliance with agency
goals. 57 In turn, careerists, as opposed to transients, will tend to
depend more on the agency for self-respect, prestige, and power."
The careerist's identity is thus tied closely to that of the agency.
Group discipline and cohesiveness is high. A "group-think" men-
tality emerges from consensus among actors:
When a policy-making group becomes highly cohesive, a
homogenization of viewpoints takes place, helping the group to
preserve its unity by enabling all the members to continue to
support the decisions to which the group has become
committed.5
Moreover, the more cohesive the group, the greater group-think
U Many civil service employees can be termed careerists. Another area manned primari-
ly by careerists is the military services. Promotion to higher rungs of their structured lad-
ders is often dependent on established criteria. One of the advantages of both of these areas
is the long-term benefits employees receive.
Approximately 16% of public officers are appointed outside the competitive civil ser-
vice, either by the President or by or under the authority of department heads who are
presidential appointees. The importance of these officers, who are generally "transients," is
seen in their positions which include every substantial policy-making office. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 38, at 27.
U See factors included in background in Section II. E, Point of View or Mind-Set, supra
" For example, some jobs, such as jobs in the military, carry a certain number of years of
commitment when one enlists and other jobs, such as cabinet and sub-cabinet positions, are
dependent on the President who appointed the agency officers.
"7 DOWNS, supra note 1, at 211. Downs calls this behavior the "Law of Self-Serving Loyalty."
' Seiler, supra note 40, at 123.
U 1. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUP THINK 116 (1972).
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type of conformity exists due to the greater inner compulsion of
each member to avoid creating disunity by believing in the sound-
ness of the leader's or majority's proposals.' Since the agency
"line" will be protected at all costs, interactions with other agen-
cies will tend to be inflexible.
On the other hand, conflict resolution should be easier when the
actors in the interaction are non-careerists. Not constrained by
any "group-think" mentality, transients and those more concerned
with their reputation outside the agency as a capable problem
solver are more flexible and innovative in their interagency ap-
proaches.
Symptoms of "group-think" mentalities among agency actors
are: 1) an illusion of invulnerability, 2) construction of rationaliza-
tions, 3) a belief in the inherent morality of their group, 4)
stereotyped views of the leaders of enemy groups, 5) application
of direct pressure to nonconforming individuals, 6) self-censorship,
7) an illusion of unanimity, and 8) mind-guards for leaders and fellow
members from adverse information."
G. Goal Consensus (or Compatibility)
Agencies are directed in their tasks toward achieving certain
objectives or goals. Congressional mandates specify some of these
goals. Other operational goals emerge as a set of constraints defin-
ing acceptable performance from a mix of the expectations and
demands of other agencies and governmental bodies, demands
from citizens and special interest groups, and bargaining within
the agency. These agency goals are not compatible with the in-
terests of every group within the agency; rather, they represent
an initial resolution of intra-agency conflict.2 This conflict over
goals, however, is heightened when each actor represents a dif-
ferent agency desiring to advance different, sometimes directly
opposite objectives.
The conditions that each agency has been directed towards in
its enabling legislation or the internal construction of its man-
date" are an important factor in determining whether the goals of
** I. Janis, Group, Think, in CLASSICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 157-58 (W. Natemeyer
ed. 1978). The danger of "group think" is that each individual will think his group's proposal
a good one without making a careful scrutiny of the advantages and disadvantages of the
alternatives. Id. at 158.
61 Id at 158-162.
" ALLISON, supra note 34, at 82.
" See discussion in Section II. B, Jurisdictional Boundaries, supra.
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those agencies in the interaction will conflict or be compatible.
Other indications of agency goals may be found from a survey of
the interacting agencies' clientele, from congressional hearings,
and from a historical survey of the various agencies' goals.
Whether agencies with compatible goals will work to maximize
policy consistency in the interaction process is dependent in large
part on the proportion of incentives to disincentives to reach
results. As has been shown already, incentives are necessary to
motivate agencies to cooperate in their interactions with other
agencies which have overlapping authority or jurisdiction over
the same policy task." Incentives include the threat of congres-
sional reveiw of appropriations, the threat of presidential involve-
ment and his possible anger over immobilization, and the threat of
press involvement.
On the other hand, disincentives to interagency cooperation ex-
ist for an agency when it has the opportunity to dominate other
agencies. This occurs through application of power principles or
when it perceives room for aggrandizement of the territory of
another agency and desires to show that this particular agency is
not doing a satisfactory job. If incentives are greater than
disincentives in the interagency relationship, agencies with com-
patible goals will work to maximize consistent policy outcomes.
This is true even though the agencies' perspectives of their goals
are probably different. However, if incentives and disincentives
are equal, the outcome of the interaction is then dependent on the
personalities of the agency leaders directly involved in the in-
teraction. If the other possibility of disincentives being greater
than incentives is the case, the outcome is non-productive and in-
teragency conflict becomes manifest and persists.
If agencies have been designated specific policy roles by con-
gressional mandate or have been allocated specific roles through
informal processes, it is highly possible that the goals of even com-
patible interacting agencies might be improper in relation to these
policy roles. Agencies often exceed the limits of the jurisdictional
and territorial restraints imposed upon them by Congress,
especially when the boundaries are not well defined.5 This in-
dependent agency action may also occur in interagency relations
as those agencies with compatible goals collude to assure a power
basis in the desired policy area for each cooperating agency."
6 See note 16, supra.
" See discussion in Section II. C, Power Principles, supra.
Id.
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If the mandate governing the common policy tasks of many
agencies is unclear, a struggle between the interacting agencies
over the hierarchy of goals to govern the interpretation of the
mandate often ensues. The agencies which are stronger and more
aggressive are likely to be successful in asserting and having their
particular construction of the mandate prevail, especially if there
is a lack of policy guidance from above the agency level. 7
Although the existence of a reward system of incentives is dif-
ficult to measure, the examination of directives from various bran-
ches of government to the interacting agencies might be a useful
barometer. To determine those agencies which are most suc-
cessful in asserting their understanding of mandates, a represen-
tative sample of critical interagency decisions can be taken to see
which agencies' views prevail most often.
H. Deflection of Goals
Another variable is the deflection of agency goals. Agency effi-
ciency is enhanced by rational pursuit of its proper goals; when an
agency is deflected from this pursuit it will not perform as intend-
ed. Deflection of goals can occur in a number of different ways.
One situation in which deflection occurs is when an agency's
programs have gotten underway and begin to move in their in-
tended direction. Groups originally on the outside see new oppor-
tunities for their own goals and objectives to receive attention,
and they manage to have their goals added to the agency's initial
ones. This has been called the "Piling On Game."" Although the
initial goals remain, their importance has been reduced.
A survey of agency clientele to determine whether it has
become more diverse over the agency's lifetime is one measure of
deflection by the addition of new goals. Another measure is a
historical survey of the goals themselves to see to what extent
they have remained constant. Congressional hearings on the pro-
gram in question might also revea1 the addition of new goals.
Changes in top agency personnel might result in new goals being
One example of this consequence is seen in the export licensing area. This area is
characterized by a multiplicity of agency actors who disagree on a hierarchy of goals. A
struggle ensues among the agency's actors each time a problem arises as to which goal
should receive priority, and there is a definite lack of unified policy guidance from above
the bureaucratic level. The national security interest often prevails in the process of agency
compromise.
U E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BECOMES A LAW
85 (1977).
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added by the new leaders.
The danger of the "Piling On Game" is that the additional goals
may create an unsupportable political burden for the agency. 9 An
example of a collapse caused by such a burden is Project Mohole,
a government venture in "big science."7
When an agency's goals become so multitudinous and important
as to be incapable of fulfillment through lack of funding, personnel
or expertise, the agency's very survival may be threatened. The
agency's role in interagency relations is then reduced to self-
preservation. The goals of stronger agencies are likely to prevail
in such conflict situations. One incentive to the threatened agency
to cooperate in policy implementation is a guarantee from other
interacting agencies to not adversely affect its existence by en-
croaching on its jurisdiction. An examination of the threatened
agency's success in achieving its goals through concrete activities
is a means of determining the extent of overburdening from addi-
tional goals.
Another instance of goal deflection is when the agency's
primary goal is too difficult to attain and the agency instead
directs its energies to achieving short-term objectives. Philip
Selznich described this problem as a common one for government
agencies:7
Running an organization, -as a specialized and essential activity,
generates problems which have no necessary (and often oppos-
ed) relationship to the professed or 'original' goals of the
organization. The day-to-day behavior of the group becomes
centered around specific problems and approximate goals which
have primarily an internal relevance. Then, since these ac-
tivities come to consume an increasing proportion of the time
"Id.
Project Mohole began with a grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF) to the
American Miscellaneous Society (AMSOC) and its affiliate for the project, the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS), for initial feasibility studies of drilling through the ocean bot-
tom to a hypothesized layer below the earth's crust and above the earth's mantle known as
the Moho. These studies were successfully completed. At this point, the Executive
Secretary and new Chairman of AMSOC prodded AMSOC into taking on the broader objec-
tive of widespread sampling of the layers above the Moho to add to mankind's understand-
ing of the history of the oceans and life itself. This attempt to increase the project's scope
and complexity "divided the scientific community, increased the technical problems for the
contractor, alienated necessary allies in the establishment agencies (NSF and NAS), and
fueled political opposition that had opposed the project from the start even in its less am-
bitious versions." The end result was that the Senate and House refused to fund the pro-
ject, whose estimated costs had increased to at least $100 million. Id. at 85-88.
" Selznick, An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy, 8 AM. Soc. R. 49 (1943).
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and thoughts of the participants, they are-from the point of
view of actual behavior- substituted for the professed goals. 2
To determine whether an agency has strayed from serving its in-
tended purpose to a fixation on internal problems or on objectives
for which immediate results are possible, an examination of
espoused agency goals over time to determine to what extent they
have changed and a comparison of mandated goals to espoused
goals are useful measures.
When an agency has displaced its primary goal, the short-term
objectives it substitutes are probably goals over which Congress
did not intend for the agency to have any jurisdiction or authority.
The new goals might well be those which other agencies are pur-
suing under their legal mandates. The resulting confusion of roles
can create conflict between agencies operating under their man-
dated goals and the agency which has embarked upon the pursuit
of self-formulated goals, especially if the agencies' regulations and
other means of achieving the goals are inconsistent. Moreover,
this situation creates confusion in Congress and the Executive
Branch over which agency is accountable for achieving particular
goals. Fundamental problems of allocation are presented as well.
Ways to measure goal deflection include surveys of budget re-
quests and allocations to determine if money is requested for the
same purpose by different agencies and surveys of regulated par-
ties to measure protests of conflicting and overlapping regula-
tions.
I. Agency Representation in the Interaction
The final variable in the analysis relates to the type of person
selected by the agency to represent it in interactions with other
agencies. What happens in any situation obviously depends on the
people involved. In interagency conflict situations, the status,
agency rank, career stage, background and personality type of the
actors can be as important as any of the factors above.
Since status is an indirect symbol of prestige and power, agen-
cies are status-conscious. An agency actor's status and authority
within the agency will thus normally reflect the importance and
prestige of the interagency interaction and assignment. The situa-
tion is complicated, however, by the use of various mechanisms in
the interagency interaction beyond one-to-one relationships by
SId. at 8.
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representatives of each agency.
Committee voting systems have been frequently resorted to by
agencies to help solve some of the complex and intractable pro-
blems with which two or more agencies may be confronted. The
voting system may require only a plurality to assure a decision, or
it may requre a majority or even unanimity. If the level of
representation on the committee is not uniform, i.e., some
representatives are at the secretary level, some are staff officers,
and others are low-level bureaucrats, significant problems arise
because agencies are status conscious.73
It is especially difficult to carry out serious interactions when
authority and prestige are inconsistent if the interaction is sub-
ject to public scrutiny. One might expect, for instance, a cabinet
secretary to carry out private negotiations with another state's
premier, but a public treaty signing must be effectuated by two
actors having the same authority and prestige. Legally signifi-
cant agreements could not effectively be completed by actors
having different levels of prestige. Thus, in conceptualizing
the consequences of agency representation, it is important to ask
where the interaction takes place, who the parties are, and
whether the interaction is public or private.7'
III. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK: EXPORT PROMOTION
PROGRAM
An area in which this framework can be applied is the area of
the joint export promotion program of the Commerce and State
Departments. Due to concern over the efficiency and economy of
this program, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs held hearings in
March 1977 on this export promotion program.7 5 Their stated con-
cern was that although the program had been sold to them
primarily as an aid to small businessmen who want to export but
Seiler, at 121, supra note 40.
' In an interview with Professor Dean Rusk. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the "top men" in
the agency have occasionally demanded that all interagency communications be channeled
through them. When this happens, Mr. Rusk said, communication is discouraged.
Understanding is best facilitated and promoted when intelligence is exchanged at com-
parative levels in the bureaucracy. Interview, University of Georgia School of Law, Athens,
Georgia, Feb. 6, 1979.
"' Commerce and State Departments Export Promotion Program: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (statement of Benjamin S. Rosenthal)
[hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings).
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lack the experience and knowledge, there were substantial
grounds for believing that the major beneficiaries of the program
were large, experienced exporters." This concern was reinforced
by a Joint-Evaluation Report by the Commerce and State Depart-
ments released in February 1977.17 One of the findings of the
House Subcommittee was that a principal reason for the export
program being undermined is the chronic conflict between the
Commerce and State Departments in their joint administration of
this program. 8
Commerce Department responsibility for export promotion is
centered in the Domestic and International Business Administra-
tion (DIBA) with primary responsibility in its Bureau of Interna-
tional Commerce (BIC). 9 Various offices of the BIC formulate and
operate programs abroad and in Washington; the DIBA's Office of
Field Operations serves as liason to the U.S. business community
for the programs.8 State Department responsibilities are an-
chored for the most part in the Bureau of Economic and Business
Affairs and in the regional bureaus."' In addition, Foreign Service
personnel are responsible for operating and servicing the pro-
grams in the various countries.2
With the number of participating agencies limited to State and
Commerce and their sub-agencies or offices, this is not the best
example for validating the "number of agencies involved"
variable. Still, even when only these two agencies are involved,
several of the conflict problems anticipated for large numbers of
agencies are present. For instance, there are failures and delays
in communication at all levels between the two agencies. One ex-
ample of this arises out of the separate budget procedures under-
taken by both agencies. At the top levels, the Commerce Depart-
ment has failed to inform the Department of State of budget
changes affecting key programs until after the changes have
become formal parts of Commerce's budget, and State in turn has
failed to inform Commerce in advance of reprogramming actions
or of changes made in working level agreements on budgets and
I' Id at 1.
" 1977 Hearings, supra note 75, Appendix 2: Joint Commerce/State Evaluation of the
Commercial Function [hereinafter cited as Joint Evaluation Report].
11 HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXPORT PROMOTION
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE AND STATE, H.R. REP. No. 95-576,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as EXPORT REPORT].
" Id at 2.
so Id
81 Id
Joint Evaluation Report, supra note 77, at 188.
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resources allocated to the programs.'
Time delays are a significant consequence of program output
having to be transmitted by more than one agency before it reaches
the client. With the Trade Opportunities Program, a trade lead
originates with the Foreign Service, is transmitted to the Com-
merce Department in Washington where it is processed, and is
then sent to subscribers. In the approximately twelve days that
this takes, a "hot" lead can turn "cold,"" thus thwarting the pro-
gram objective.
The mandates setting forth the allocation of jurisdiction over
export promotion programs diffuse authority between the Com-
merce and State Departments." Commerce is granted general
statutory authority and responsibility for domestic and interna-
tional trade promotion, while State is given control of all overseas
operations carrying out such functions. State and Commerce func-
tions in this area necessarily overlap, and the turbulent relations
between the Departments in administering these joint programs
suggest that their formal guidelines do not clearly define their
roles. As predicted by the framework, a tendency toward in-
teragency conflict results when jurisdictional guidelines are am-
biguous. An example of this conflict is seen in the problem of who
to blame for recommending businessmen with questionable ethical
backgrounds in Commerce's World Trade Data Reports."
Commerce and State attempted to clarify their jurisdictional
boundaries by formulating a number of working agreements over
the years. A clarification of the role and position of commercial at-
tachies in the Foreign Service and of Commerce's role in selecting
and controlling these attaches was a special focus of these
agreements." However, because these agreements were not ac-
cepted by the agency actors in their attempted implementation,"
they have not been effective in securing cooperation between the
8 EXPORT REPORT, note 78 supra, note 42.
Id. at 43.
Reorganization Plan No. 11 of 1939, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, and Executive
Order 10249 (June 4, 1961). EXPORT REPORT, note 78 supra, at 41-42.
" When questioned on why foreign businessmen involved in questionable or illegal
foreign payments were placed in the Report, Commerce first put the blame on State, claim-
ing State was responsible at its foreign service posts for collecting information and prepar-
ing the Report, while Commerce merely disseminated this data. EXPORT REPORT, note 78
supra, at 37; 1977 Hearings, note 75 supra, at 257, 279.
7 EXPORT REPORT, note 78 supra, at 42.
" Commerce accused State of not making a good faith effort to comply with the
agreements, and State charged that Commerce sought to go beyond the objectives of the
agreements. EXPORT REPORT, note 78 supra, at 44.
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two agencies. Indeed, this lack of coordination of program respon-
sibilities is partly the reason why "there is at this time no general-
ly agreed or widely understood U.S. policy on the extent of need
for or the purposes of official export promotion."' 9 Due to respon-
sibility for the overall coordination of the export promotion pro-
gram being "fuzzy," ad hoc liaison procedures for each area of in-
terest are the present means of operation. Since "no institutional
arrangement now exists for effective coordination when problems
cannot be resolved at the operating level,"" conflict is inevitable.
The power principle variable helps to explain the basic tension
existing between State and Commerce. Each agency is Downs'
"territorial imperialist" engaged in an underlying struggle to
dominate or maintain control of export promotion activities in
foreign nations. 1 A common mistrust exists between Comerce and
State and neither agency is content with its present position in
policy space vis-a-vis the other agency.
Commerce takes an aggressive stance; some groups within
Commerce want the agency to have its own foreign service or at
least greater control over foreign commercial activities and con-
trol over State employees engaged in commercial work under the
present system. On the other hand, State firmly adheres to its
position that the United States should have one unified foreign
service to carry out all U.S. governmental activities in foreign na-
tions." Instead of putting more of its employees in these foreign
commercial positions (as might be the expected means of asserting
its dominance), State handles its end of the power struggle by put-
ting less employees on commercial matters than other functions
and putting those officers of lowest career status in commercial
positions.9 3 The House Report concludes that the present situa-
tion-a stand-off marked by suspicion and bureaucratic conflict
between the agencies-is expected to continue and as long as it
does, "export promotion efforts will continue to be inefficient and
ineffective.""
An example of Commerce's use of its "power quotient" to main-
tain its active involvement in the foreign activities of its export
programs is its staunch support of fifteen U.S. trade centers
" EXPORT REPORT, note 78 supra, at 42; Joint Evaluation Report, note 77 supra, at 168.
' Joint Evaluation Report, note 77 supra, at 170.
, EXPORT REPORT, note 78 supra, at 44.
Id. at 48.
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operated in major foreign commercial markets. Commerce uses its
financial clout here as it devotes more than one quarter of the
Bureau of International Commerce's total export promotion
budget to the operation and staffing of these trade centers."5 Even
though these trade centers are inefficient," Commerce views
them as a prestigious way of promoting its presence abroad in
partial competition with State. State's weapon for maintaining its
control over foreign commercial programs is the Ambassadors' or
Deputy Chiefs of Missions' exercise of their discretion to divert
funds marked for commercial purposes to administrative, political,
social, or other functions.Y Such actions by State generate con-
siderable conflict with Commerce. A sanction which Commerce
uses to exert some control over State and which also produces in-
teragency conflict is its role in evaluating State Department per-
sonnel responsible for commercial functions."
Although there is agreement between Commerce and State on
the general goal of increasing the level of U.S. exports by en-
couraging and assisting U.S. business, there is little direction on
how to achieve this goal." The legal mandates do not provide
much guidance on this problem. The Commerce and State Depart-
ments have conflicting policy objectives and priorities in their par-
ticipation in export promotion, and this lack of consensus has
hampered cooperation.'" Because the situation between Com-
merce and State is best understood as a power struggle, the goal
consensus variable does not significantly aid in understanding the
interrelations between the two departments.
The goal deflection variable, in contrast to the goal consensus
variable, helps explain a major problem contributing to the inef-
fectiveness of the present export promotion program. Due to the
difficulties of achieving the goal of promoting exports when Com-
merce and State disagree as to the means to be used, both agen-
cies have tended to lose sight of the primary goal by concen-
trating on short-term objectives, (Commerce's trade centers
for instance). There has been a tendency to view marketing pro-
grams as ends in themselves rather than as trade promotion tools.
Id. at 2-3.
, Even the Joint Evaluation Report recognized that "established trade centers tended to
produce diminishing returns in markets where they have existed for a few years." Joint
Evaluation Report, note 77 supra, at 168.
EXPORT REPORT, note 78 supra, at 46-47.
Id. at 47.
" Id. at 8-9.
, Id. at 44.
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This results in a failure to diagnose a company's particular export
problem and to seek a remedy. 1 1 Probably the most glaring failure
of the joint export promotion program is the slight benefit that
small businessmen who desire to export but lack export ex-
perience have received from it. Congress was told by State and
Commerce when it funded this $50 million a year joint export pro-
gram that aid to these small businessmen would be the major
thrust of the program. ' Instead, large multinational firms who do
not need governmental aid have been the major beneficiaries of
the program. Commerce and State have taken the lackadaisical
approach of supporting projects such as the out-moded trade
center program instead of trying to formulate new programs to
stimulate would-be exporters. The small businesses and inex-
perienced exporters are thus ignored, despite their serious need
for export promotion aid and despite the departments' pledge to
Congress to direct their programs toward the needs of this group.
An examination of the Departments' differing approaches to
their job responsibilities reveals several important consequences
for interagency conflict which are anticipated in the work environ-
ment variable. First, as to the planning, development, and evalua-
tion of export promotion programs, an area in which Commerce
has primary responsibility, there are serious communication prob-
lems within the Department between planners and those in the
agency responsible for designing, operating, and carrying out the
programs. This is in large part due to the confusion in Commerce's
hierarchy of command. Policy guidance from the top officials is
limited and there is little coordination between departments with
interrelated functions. ' In addition, the State Department takes a
rather inactive role in the planning and evaluation aspect as it
primarily confines its role to a determination of whether the
resources available to the programs are appropriate.'" Because of
the wide differentiation in the approaches of State and Commerce
to program planning and evaluation, the potential for conflict an-
ticipated by our framework is realized in the coordination of im-
portant activities such as a commercial program budget.115 Similar
coordination problems exist in the actual provision of commercial
programs and services, an area in which State and Commerce
, Joint Evaluation Report, note 77 supra, at 169, 182.
1 1977 Hearings, supra note 75, at 1.
"' Joint Evaluation Report, note 77 supr, at 185-186.
Id. at 182.
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share responsibilities. Because there is no mechanism within each
agency to resolve problems at operating levels, neither of the two
main units involved in interagency coordination- Commerce's Of-
fice of International Marketing and State's Bureau of Economic
and Business Affairs-is able to speak effectively with a single
voice.'" The lack of certainty that the proposals from the separate
agencies represent their respective hierarchies creates, as our
framework explains, problems for effective interagency liaison.
The lack of similarity between the two organizations and their ap-
proaches to their functions also creates difficulties for interagency
conflict resolution.
One of the most important variables contributing to an
understanding of the conflict between State and Commerce in the
export promotion area is the agencies' different "mind-sets" or
"points of view." The Department of State has a political "mind-
set;" its commercial functions in the export promotion program
are performed with a non-commercial orientation. Commenting on
the low status that State has for a long time given economic and
commercial matters, the Commission on the Organization of
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy stated in 1974 that:
The evidence also seems compelling, as presented in virtually
every case study, that the government-wide problem of non-
communication- which is so severe that it might be termed
cultural division -between "political" and "economic" specialists
is even more serious at State than elsewhere, and that the pro-
fessional caste to which the economist is relegated in that
Department is generally and more systematically lower.",
As suggested by our framework, a survey of the backgrounds of
the State Department employees engaged in export promotion
compared with the backgrounds of State employees in general is a
useful means of determining whether this smaller group of
employees is an aberration within State or whether it shares
State's common background. Even though the State employees in
export promotion need to have substantial commercial skills and
experience to effectively perform their functions, surveys show
that the overwhelming majority of persons in Deputy Chief of
Mission positions and of foreign service officers in commercially
' Id at 190.
E. K. Hamilton, Summary ReporL" Principal Lessons of the Last Decade and
Thoughts on the Next in Appendices: 3 COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERN-
MENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY, Appendix H at 9 (1975) (Murphy Commission
Report).
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designated positions have little or no commercial experience.108
(The changes that State initiated in 1973 to fill more commercial
positions, especially principal officers, with experienced personnel
have not resulted in noticeable improvements in this area).0 9 In
addition to being treated as second class citizens with respect to
their status within State,10 State Department personnel in the
commercial field also suffer from a lower mean bureaucratic level
than State personnel in general. Studies reveal that, due in large
part to the unfavorable bias toward commercial work among some
senior State officials, those with principally commercial ex-
perience have a difficult time being promoted to upper level posi-
tions.1 Export promotion personnel in Commerce have, ap-
propriately, a commercial "mind-set." Many of them, however, are
too generalist-oriented "mind-set." Many of them, however, are
mand. Thus, a number of problems have been noted in the train-
ing, recruitment, and assignment of Commerce officers."'
With their differing "mind-sets," Commerce and State actors do
not talk the same language. Moreover, evidence of attitudes
tenaciously held by some officers in the two agencies concerning
the motivations and interests of the other agency indicates that
neither agency understands the other's viewpoint. "' Both of these
factors have created fundamental communication problems be-
tween State and Commerce which, as this framework predicted,
have adversely affected the interagency implementation of the ex-
port promotion program.
A further refinement of Commerce's "mind-set" is that it is
oriented in favor of large corporations. This orientation is
reflected in Commerce's principal advisory group for export pro-
motional issues, the President's Export Council, which consists ex-
clusively of big business representatives.' It is no wonder that
small businessmen complain that they have not had an adequate
voice in formulation of federal export promotion programs.15 One
expects small businessmen's needs and interests to be ignored
when Commerce and State have conflicting "mind-sets" and small
businessmen are unable to speak the language of either agency.
106 EXPORT REPORT, note 78 supra, at 45, 46.
I6 Jd at 45.
' Id at 46.
"m Id.
" Joint Evaluation Report, note 77 supra, at 172, 193.
's Id. at 169.
"' 1977 Hearings, note 75 supra, at 109.
"6 EXPORT REPORT, note 78 supra, at 14.
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The policy of the State Department to staff its commercial posi-
tions with personnel having low status within State is bound to
have negative implications for State's effectiveness in asserting
its positions in conflicts with Commerce. Applying the variable
dealing with an actor's representation in the interaction process,
Commerce actors' are aware of State actors' low status. On the
other hand, Commerce is known to send inexperienced personnel
to trade missions as advance people to work with the foreign ser-
vice posts, identity prospective buyers, arrange appointments,
and handle administrative details."1 State actors at the foreign
service posts are likely to view these particular Commerce per-
sonnel as unnecessary and inefficient, and thus are likely to domi-
nate any interactions with them.
There is no evidence from the hearings and reports relied on for
information from which to draw a conclusion on whether conflict
resolution is easier when non-careerists rather than careerists are
the agency actors involved in the interaction. This lack of
evidence may be substantially due to the fact that both Commerce
and State are plagued in the export promotion area by high staff
turnover which results in inefficient management and program
performance. 1 7
IV. CONCLUSION
People and groups who must deal with two or more government
agencies often have problems. They may be asked to perform
several inconsistent tasks, they must often fill out time-consuming
forms, and they may be ordered to take action or be threatened
with punishment. These contacts with government agencies are
especially annoying when there is doubt that the agency has the
authority it claims. This framework, it is hoped, provides a critical
way to view the problems inherent in interagency interaction.
While we have applied the framework to only one export-related
program, the broad analytical variables should be useful in other
situations where interagency conflict arises.
Not all of the factors will be relevant in analyzing a given pro-
blem. Some problems involving multi-agency conflict are purely
legal problems. Their solutions lie in the statutes which create the
agencies and in the regulations imposed by the agencies. Other
problems, such as personality problems, are beyond the scope of
I l at 35.
"' Id at 34-35, 46.
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this Note. Still, it is hoped that this Note provides a set of factors
to help illuminate the actions, motivations and interests which
play a role in the interagency process. When concrete problems
narrow the field of inquiry and the relevant government agencies
take conflicting approaches to these problems, this framework is
designed to be a starting point for analysis leading to a better
decision-making process.
Betsy C. Cox
Gary Shmerling
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